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PROCEDURAL CHARACTERIZATION OF POST-JUDGMENT
REQUESTS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES -ELIMINATING
ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS TO AWARDS
INTRODUCTION
Over the past seventeen years, Congress has developed an impor-
tant method of promoting the enforcement of civil rights through its
enactment of various statutes that shift the expenses of a prevailing
party's attorney to the unsuccessful party in the action.' The most
widely applicable statute authorizing courts to award attorney's fees is
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 19762 (1976 Act),
which provides that courts "in [their] discretion, may allow the pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs. " 3 The legislative history of the 1976 Act
clearly indicates Congress' intent that prevailing plaintiffs should ordi-
1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976) (provides for court a-ards of attor-
ney's fees to prevailing parties in cases involving discrimination or segregation in
places of public accommodation); id. § 2000e-5(k) (provides for awards of attorney's
fees in cases of employment discrimination). See generally Ehrenzweig, Reimburse-
ment of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 792 (1966); .Malson, In
Reponse to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 St.
Louis U.L.J. 430 (1977); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New
Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 Fordham L. Rev. 761 (1972); Nussbaum,
Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 301 (1973); Williams,
Fee Shifting and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A.J. 859 (1978); Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 636
(1974); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 Colum. J. of L. &
Soc. Prob. 381 (1971); Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 346 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Promoting Civil Rights]; Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney
General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 Hast-
ings L.J. 733 (1973). Congress has enacted statutes authorizing courts to shift the
expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees, from the prevailing party to the un-
successful party in many areas of the law. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (antitrust);
id. § 1117 (trademark infringement); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976) (environmental pro-
tection). There are currently more than 100 laws that permit courts to award attor-
ney's fees. See 4 Fed. Attorney Fee Awards Rep. 2, 3 (Dec. 1980).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)).
The 1976 Act authorizes courts to award attorney's fees, at their discretion, under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (guarantees equal protection of the law), id. § 1982 (guarantees
equal property rights), id. § 1983 (permits civil redress for discrimination under color
of state law), id. § 1985 (permits civil redress for conspiracy to deny civil rights), id.
§ 1986 (permits civil redress against officers who fail to enforce § 1985), id. §§ 2000d
to 2000d-6 (prohibits discrimination in federally aided programs based on race, color,
or national origin), and 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) (prohibits discrimination in
federally aided educational programs based on sex or blindness).
3. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90
Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (1976)).
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narily recover their attorney's fees,4 unless special circumstances are
present that would render an award unjust.3
The 1976 Act is silent, however, concerning the manner in which
courts should proceed with requests for attorney's fees made after
judgment has been entered on the underlying dispute. The First Cir-
cuit has held, 6 and the Tenth Circuit has stated in dicta,- that post-
judgment requests must be brought pursuant to rule 59(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' which governs alterations and
amendments to judgment and prescribes a ten day time limit for ser-
vice of motions.' They reason that, because there are significant
areas of overlap in proving a civil rights violation and establishing the
propriety of a fees award, requests for attorney's fees are properly
made and determined before entry of judgment.'" The Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits, however, have held that attorney's fees granted
under the 1976 Act are properly denominated taxable costs" gov-
erned by rule 54(d),' 2 which does not set a time limit within which
4. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report], reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5908, 5912; H.R. Rep.
No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Report]; see
Universal Amusement Co. v. Hofheinz, 616 F.2d 202, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1980); Love
v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 236 (loth Cir. 1980); International Oceanic
Enterprises, Inc. v. Menton, 614 F.2d 502, 503 (5th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Missis-
sippi, 606 F.2d 635, 636 (5th Cir. 1979); Iranian Students Assoc. v. Edwards, 604 F.2d
352, 353 (5th Cir. 1979); Concerned Democrats v. Reno, 601 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir.
1979) (per curiam); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); Carey v. New York Gaslight Club,
Inc., 598 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); Criterion Club of
Albany v. Board of Comm'rs, 594 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1979); Green v. Ten Eyck,
572 F.2d 1233, 1243 (8th Cir. 1978).
5. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5912; House Report, supra note 4, at 6. The issue of when a denial of
an award is justified, however, is unsettled. Compare Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d
1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979) (denying fees on basis of private fee arrangement is not an
abuse of discretion) with Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978) (pri-
vate fee arrangement does not constitute special circumstance that renders fee award
unjust). See generally Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 365-71.
6. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 699
(1st Cir. 1980); accord, Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 62 (E.D. Va. 1979).
7. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 787-88 (10th Cir. 1980).
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
9. Id.
10. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 787-88 (10th Cir. 1980); White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 704 (1st Cir. 1980).
11. Johnson v. Snyder, No. 79-3459, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1981); Jones
v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
Bond v. Stanton, 530 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980). Van Ooteghcm v. Gray, 628
F.2d 488, 497 (5th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir.
1980); accord, Janicki v. Pizza, No. 78-242, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 1980);
Anderson v. Moras, No. 80-1632 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 1980).
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
[Vol. 49
ATTORNEY'S FEES
bills of costs must be submitted.' These courts literally construe the
"'as part of the costs" terminology of the 1976 Act as meaning taxable
costs. "4
This Note contends that characterizing attorney's fees as taxable
costs is the more logical and practicable of the two interpretations.
Part I reviews congressional intent in enacting attorney's fees awards
statutes in civil rights cases. Part II examines the purposes of rules
59(e) and 54(d) and the rationales for applying each to post-judgment
requests for attorney's fees. Part III discusses the practical ramifica-
tions of using each rule in light of congressional intent to provide for
these awards.
13. Id.; see American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 41 F.R.D.
161, 163 (D. Minn. 1966); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 36 F.R.D. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
14. Johnson v. Snyder, No. 79-3459, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1981), Jones
v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Van Ooteghem v. Cray, 628
F.2d 488, 497 (5th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir.
1980); accord, Janicki v. Pizza, No. 78-242, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24. 1980).
Anderson v. Moras, No. 80-1632 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 1980). Theoretically, post-
judgment determinations of attorney's fees under the 1976 Act may he characterized
as collateral to an underlying judgment pursuant to the equitable method of awarding
fees, out of the general recovery, to plaintiffs who have successfully undertaken
litigation that has benefited individuals not parties to the suit. See Sprague v. Ticonic
Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 163 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 53
(1882); Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1980);
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 517 F.2d 555. 561 (7th Cir. 1975). In Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). the Supreme Court held that
claims that are "separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action" may'
be appealed while the rest of the case is interlocutory, id. at 546. thus creating the
collateral order doctrine. See 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice 110.10 (2d ed. 1980).
Therefore, a court that determines claims after a judgment is final essentially applies
the collateral order doctrine in reverse fashion. Swanson v. American Consumer In-
dus., Inc., 517 F.2d 555, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1975). The application of this doctrine is
proper only when the claim asserted as collateral is "separable from and not [an
ingredient] of any identifiable claims for relief." Hooks v. Washington Sheraton
Corp., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Unless the definition of
collateral is broadened, however, the application of this theory to statutory awards of
fees, such as the 1976 Act, seems untenable because, unlike statutorv awards, equi-
table awards do not "saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses but . . . impose
them on the class that has benefited from them." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970); see Note, Reimbursement for Attorneys' Fees from the
Beneficiaries of Representative Litigation. 58 Minn. L. Rev. 933. 935-36 (1974).
Thus, defendant's liability is totally accounted for in such cases and the court merely
apportions the cost of bringing the action out of the general damages recovered.
Statutory awards of fees, on the other hand, create a new form of liability that may
be substantial. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Carrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 599-600 (ist Cir.)
(attorney's fee award in excess of $100,000). cert. denied. 49 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Oct. 6.
1980) (No. 79-1979); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46. 48 (ist Cir. 1979)
(attorney's fee award in excess of $200,000).
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I. THE 1976 AcT-PROMOTING ENFORCEMENT OF
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
The "American Rule" regarding attorney's fees is that each party to
a suit is responsible for paying his own attorney.'" In enacting attor-
ney's fees provisions in the area of civil rights, however, Congress has
consistently recognized that the protection of civil liberties is of para-
mount importance." The 1976 Act specifically was enacted to ensure
that parties alleging violations of their civil rights will not hesitate to
bring meritorious suits 17 under applicable civil rights statutes because
they cannot afford to hire attorneys to represent them.'8
15. The "American Rule" evolved from an early Supreme Court decision, Arcam-
bel v. Wisemen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), in which the Court held that the judici-
ary would not fashion its own rules to award attorney's fees. Id. at 306; see Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-50 (1975). Courts have
subsequently reasoned that, because the outcome of a case may be uncertain, parties
should not be penalized for defending or prosecuting an action, and the poor should
not be discouraged from bringing suit for fear that, if they are unsuccessful, they will
have to pay their adversary's attorney. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brew-
ing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see 1 S. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees §§ 12:3-12:9
(1973). There are, however, instances in which courts will award attorney's fees,
despite the absence of statutory authority, pursuant to principles of equity. In Trus-
tees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882), for example, the Supreme Court established
the common fund exception to the "American Rule." Id. at 536. In Greenough, the
Court allowed a party who had successfully brought an action that created a fund as
judgment, the proceeds of which benefited many, to recover his expenses in bringing
the action, including his attorney's fee, from the fund. Id. The Court reasoned that
the plaintiff had "acted the part of a trustee in relation to the common interest," and
to deny him his expenses "would not only be unjust to him, but it would give to the
other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage."
Id. at 532. This rationale was expanded in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161 (1939), in which the Court awarded attorney's fees to a plaintiff who, because of
the stare decisis effect of his action, allowed others to benefit similarly. Id. at 167-69.
The equitable power to award fees was further expanded in Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), in which the Court created the common benefit ex-
ception to the "American Rule." This case involved a stockholders' derivative action
in which corporate directors were charged with soliciting proxy votes by misleading
statements. Although no fund of any type, pre-existing or created by the litigation,
was effected by the judgment, attorney's fees were awarded because "the litigation
ha[d] conferred a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and
... the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit [made] possible an
award that [would] operate to spread the costs proportionately among them." Id. at
393-94. See generally Note, Attorney's Fees, Unclaimed Funds, and Class Actions:
Application of the Common Fund Doctrine, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 370 (1979).
16. House Report, supra note 4, at 2-3; see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) (successful Title II plaintiffs should re-
ceive award of fees); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir. 1971)
(successful Title VII plaintiff should receive award of fees).
17. A plaintiff who brings a frivolous or vexatious action will not only be denied
fees, but may have defendant's fees assessed against him. See Christiansburg Car-
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The primary goal of the 1976 Act was to encourage the private
enforcement of the nation's civil rights laws.' It was passed in direct
reponse to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,2 in
which the Supreme Court severely limited the power of the courts to
award attorney's fees. Prior to Alyeska, federal courts had generally
awarded fees to civil rights litigants, even when the statutes under
which parties asserted their claims contained no fees provision.2'
These awards were based on a previous Supreme Court statement
that a plaintiff bringing an action under Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act ' functioned as a " 'private attorney general,' vindicating a
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." ' The
ment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978); Currion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d
722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5910 ("the citizen who must sue to enforce the law [and] has little or no
money with which to hire a lawyer .... must have the opportunity to recover what
it costs [him] to vindicate these rights in court"); House Report, .supra note 4, at I
(the act is "designed to give . . . persons effective access to the judicial process").
19. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5910 ("civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement"h
House Report, supra note 4, at I ("effective enforcement of Federal civil rights stat-
utes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens"). The 1976 Act was fashioned
after 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976), the attorney's fees provision of Title I1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Title II actions, the Attorney Ceneral may only inter-
vene when there exists "a pattern or practice of resistance" to compliance with the
law that is "intended to deny the full exercise of the rights" provided therein, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) (1976), and when the "case is of general public importance." Id.
§ 2000a-3(a). Therefore, "[t]he bill reflects the fact that neither Congress nor the
executive branch intend that the Federal Government should become involved, un-
less it appears that the public interest needs vindication." 110 Cong. Rec. 7408
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (per curiam) ("when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
passed, it was evident . . . that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law").
20. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
21. Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), cacated and remanded,
421 U.S. 982 (1975); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 144 (8th Cir. 1974);
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Morales
v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 1973); Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 779-81 (2d
Cir. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d
852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Lee v. Southern Homes Sites Corp., 444 F.2d
143, 145-48 (5th Cir. 1971).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976). Title II provides that "[alll persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as
defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin." Id. § 2000a.
23. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam). Only the Fourth Circuit refused to apply the "private attorney general"
theory for awarding attorney's fees because it did not believe that such awards were
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Alyeska Court, however, held that, absent an express statutory provi-
sion, courts may not award attorney's fees except according to tradi-
tional equity principles.2 Thus, Congress enacted the 1976 Act "to
remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by . . . Alyes-
ka Pipeline ... and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws.",,
Congressional policy favoring the award of fees to civil rights liti-
gants is further demonstrated by its directives regarding the proper
construction of the 1976 Act.' Although technically only prevailing
parties may be awarded fees,27 a party is deemed to have prevailed in
circumstances other than when he has received a favorable judgment
after a full trial.28 For example, a plaintiff will have prevailed when
he has vindicated his rights by negotiating a settlement and entering
it as a consent decree,2 or when he has caused a defendant to cease
his illegal activity voluntarily,3o thus rendering his cause of action
within its equity power. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-31 (4th Cir. 1972),
vacated and remanded, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
24. 421 U.S. at 257-58, 269; see note 15 supra. In Alyuska, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's award of attorney's fees to the Wilderness Society, which
had successfully challenged the issuance of a permit authorizing Alyeska to begin
construction of the Alaska pipeline. 421 U.S. at 241, 244. The Court, after rejecting
the contention that courts may award attorney's fees absent statutory authorization,
reasoned that Congress is best able to decide in which situations attorney's fees
should be allowed. Id. at 263-64.
25. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5909.
26. Id. at 4-6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5912-13;
House Report, supra note 4, at 6-9. It is well-recognized that attorney's fees statutes
in the area of civil rights are to be liberally construed. See Dennis v. Chang, 611
F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980); Mid-Hudson Legal Serv., Inc. v. C & U, Inc., 578
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1978); Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390, 393 (6th
Cir. 1977); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Fla. 1978).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
28. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5912; House Report, supra note 4, at 7.
29. Maher v. Gagne, 100 S. Ct. 2570, 2575 (1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoc, 581
F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978). A consent decree is a privately negotiated contractual
settlement that is entered, with the court's consent, as a judgment. See United
States v. Landay, 513 F.2d 306, 308 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Southern Ry.,
278 F. Supp. 60, 62 (W.D.N.C. 1967). Upon entry, it has the same effect and force
as a court rendered judgment after a trial. United States v. Kellum, 523 F.2d 1284,
1287 (5th Cir. 1975); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Southworth, 76 F.R.D.
115, 123 (D.R.I. 1977); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 616 (W.D. Mich.
1971). The consent decree renders the issues resolved therein res judicata. Siegel v.
National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1974); Brunswick
Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 287 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D. Wis. 1968). A party who fails
to comply with the terms of the agreement may be held in contempt of the court.
Mc3off v. Rapone, 78 F.R.D. 8, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
30. Plaintiff's efforts must be an important factor in causing the defendant to
cease his illegal conduct. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978);
Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406, 410 (1st Cir. 1978); Mental Patient Civil Liberties
Project v. Hospital Staff Civil Rights Comm'n, 444 F. Supp. 981, 986 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
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moot.3" When a plaintiff is unsuccessful in litigating certain claims in
an action, or certain defendants are not found liable, most courts still
award fees for work done in preparation of those claims in which the
plaintiff was successful.3 2 Moreover, a minority of courts allow re-
muneration for work reasonably undertaken in preparation of the en-
tire suit.m Defendants, on the other hand, may be awarded fees only
when plaintiff's action is frivolously or vexatiously asserted ' because,
unlike civil rights plaintiffs, defendants are not " 'cloaked in a mantle
of public interest.' "3 Congress, therefore, sought to encourage
plaintiffs to bring worthy actions by allowing for their recovery of
attorney's fees in a large number of situations and limiting the in-
stances in which defendants may recover against them. ,
31. See, e.g., Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671-72 (3d Cir. 1980) (in cases
brought under the 1976 Act the focus is on relief received rather than on any formal
procedural labels), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3494 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1981) (No. 80-620);
Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[c]laims for attorneys' fees
ancillary to the case survive independently under the court's equitable jurisdiction,
and may be heard even though the underlying case has become moot"), petition for
cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1980) (No. 80-653); Robinson v. Kim-
brough, 620 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[e]ven though plaintiffs obtained no
formal judicial relief, their lawsuit was a significant catalyst in achieving their primary
objective"); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980) (although case
rendered moot, fees were awarded); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 414, 416-17 (3d
Cir. 1979) (same); Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir. 1979) (same), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 3048 (1980).
32. Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 n.9 (8th Cir. 1980); Nadeau v. Helge-
moe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d
Cir. 1978); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 916 (1978); see Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir.
1976); Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1974); Schaeffer
v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1972); Sheriff v.
Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D. Colo. 1978); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 70
F.R.D. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate School
Dist., 395 F. Supp. 304, 312 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd sub noa. Baker v. Columbus Mun.
Separate School Dist., 519 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. Crain v. City of Mountain Home, 611 F.2d 726, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1979);
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980).
34. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); Carrion v.
Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976); Wright v. Stone Container Corp.,
524 F.2d 1058, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1975); United States Steel Corp. v. United States,
519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
35. House Report, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v.
United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975)).
36. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5912 ('" 'private attorneys general' should not be deterred from bringing
good faith actions to vindicate the fundamental rights . . . by the prospect of having
to pay their opponent's counsel fees should they lose."); House Report, supra note 4,
at 7 ("[t]o avoid [a] potential "chilling effect'" defendants may recover attorney's fees
only when plaintiffs bring vexatious suits).
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Furthermore, a court that refuses to award attorney's fees to pre-
vailing plaintiffs must justify its decision.Yr Although the 1976 Act is
couched in discretionary terms, this, in itself, is not justification for a
refusal.- A court may neither refuse to award fees when plaintiffs
are financially able to assume their fees,39 nor may it justify a reduc-
tion in attorney's fees on the ground that the damages awarded are
substantial."° Thus, a court's discretion to award fees is limited by
Congress' desire that prevailing parties should be granted the costs of
hiring an attorney in most cases.
II. CHARACTERIZING THE FEES REQUEST-
COSTS VS. ALTERATIONS OF JUDGMENT
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later
than 10 days after entry of the judgment.""' A timely motion made
under rule 59(e) destroys the finality of the judgment and tolls the
time within which a party must file an appeal until the court has
ruled on the motion.12  Rule 59(e) was adopted to accommodate the
competing interests of ensuring that parties be afforded certainty in
their relations upon entry of a final order 3 and providing them with a
37. Murphy v. Kolovitz, No. 79-2441, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 1981); Sethy
v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1046 (1980); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 6417 (1st Cir. 1978).
38. See Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1979)
("court which denies an award of attorney's fees must [identify] . . . 'special circum-
stances' [that] . . . render an award unjust"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980);
Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978) (denial of fee request based
solely on grant of discretion in the 1976 Act improper).
39. International Oceanic Enterprises, Inc. v. Menton, 614 F.2d 502, 503 (5th
Cir. 1980); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Collins, 609 F.2d
151, 151 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 163-64 (5th Cir.
1977).
40. Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915, 916-20 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. Harkless v.
Sweeny Independent School Dist., 608 F.2d 594, 593 (5th Cir. 1979) (award of fees
not limited to amount of damages awarded); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600
F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979) (award of nominal damages does not justify denial of an
award). But see Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (when pros-
pects of large monetary recovery are good, fee award unnecessary), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979).
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
42. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that "[tihe running of time
for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as to all parties by a timely motion filed in
the district court.., under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment." Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a), 4(a)(6).
43. A case is final when it leaves "nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). A final judgment has a
res judicata effect, which operates as a bar to a subsequent action upon the same
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mechanism for relief from an erroneous judgment." Although the
Federal Rules are generally liberal in allowing enlargements of pre-
claim between the same parties or their privies. 6A J. Moore, supra note 14,
60.02, at 4019; see, e.g., NLRB v. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 428 F.2d
994, 999 (2d Cir. 1970) (litigation of issues that have been or could have been liti-
gated "should reach repose when final judgment ... is entered"); Flynn v. State Bd.
of Chiropractic Examiners, 418 F.2d 668, 668 (9th Cir. 1969) (final judgment on the
merits settles every issue that was raised or could have been raised and is a bar to
subsequent action). In Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897), Jus-
tice Harlan stated that the principle of finality "is demanded by the very object for
which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of
society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforce-
ment is essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals
would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if, as
between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of
such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined
by them." Id. at 49.
44. Rule 59(e) avoids injustice potentially engendered by a strict rule of finality of
judgment by making "clear that the district court possesses the power... to alter or
amend a judgment after its entry." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Advisory Committee
Notes. Rule 60 provides another basis for relief from judgment. Section (a) of the
rule allows courts to correct judgments "arising from [clerical] oversight or omission"
on their own motion or through a motion of any party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Section
(b) allows relief from judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable
neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, previous satisfaction of the judgment, or
any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(a) sets no time limit
in which correction of judgment may be made, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), and rule 60tb)
motions must be made within one year. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Section (a) of rule 60
has been construed to encompass relief from minor clerical errors and can only be
used to "make the judgment . . . speak the truth and cannot be used to make it say
something other than what originally was pronounced." C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2854, at 149 (1973); see United States v. Kenner,
455 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1972); Dow v. Baird, 389 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 1968);
West Va. Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 213 F.2d 702, 705 (5th
Cir. 1954). This section of the rule has been used to add an award of pre-judgment
interest to a judgment when it was due as a matter of right, Lee v. Joseph E.
Seagrams & Sons, 592 F.2d 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1979); Glick v. White Motor Co., 458
F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1972); In re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266 F. Supp.
605, 606-07 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, ev'd in part sub nom. O'Rourke v. Merry
Queen Transfer Corp., 370 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1967), and to add an award of costs.
Alameda v. Paraffine Co., 169 F.2d 408, 409 (9th Cir. 1948); First Nat'l Bank v.
National Airlines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Although one district
court has suggested that the omission of an award of attorney's fees from a judgment
could "arguably [be remedied] by a motion under Rule 60" if it was an "inadvertent
clerical error," Janicki v. Pizza, No. 78-242, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 1980),
the rule seems to be generally inapplicable to situations in which a judgment is
deliberately silent as to a discretionary matter. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Union
Packing Co., 527 F.2d 592, 592 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Hoffman v. Celebrezze,
405 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1969); Gray v. Dukedom Bank, 216 F.2d 108, 109-10
(6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam); United States v. Lyman, 125 F.2d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 1942);
Gilroy v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., 44 F.R.D. 3, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Although rule
60(b)(6) could theoietically be applied to post-judgment fees requests because it
allows any justification for relief from judgment not contained in the other sections of
rule 60, relief is not available under this provision absent exceptional and compelling
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scribed time limits, rule 6(b), which governs these extensions,"5 ex-
pressly forbids enlargement of the time prescribed by rule 59(e).11
Those courts that characterize post-judgment requests for fees as
amendments to judgment reason that, because attorney's fees are part
of the general relief afforded in a civil rights action, requests are
properly heard and decided with the merits of the case 41 or properly
considered along with the underlying dispute in settlement
circumstances. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950). See gener-
ally 7 J. Moore, supra note 14, T 60.27[2], at 353.
45. Rule 6(b) provides that "[w]hen by these rules . . . an act is required or
allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at
any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be clone where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
46. Id. The Advisory Committee notes to rule 6(b) state that "[t]he question to
be met under Rule 6(b) is: how far should the desire to allow correction of judgments
be allowed to postpone their finality?" Id., Advisory Committee Notes. Rule 6(b) also
forbids enlargement of the time allowed for other post-judgment motions that toll the
time in which an appeal must be filed such as rule 50(b) motions for judgments
n.o.v., rule 52(b) motions to amend or make additional findings of fact, and rule 59(b)
motions for a new trial. These motions have timeliness requirements of 10 days.
47. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 787-88 (lath Cir. 1980); White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 704 (1st Cir. 1980);
Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 60-61 (E.D. Va. 1979). If a plaintiff requests
attorney's fees in his pleadings and the court fails to act on this request, there is
strong authority that such a judgment is not a final, appealable order. See Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-44 (1976); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d
782, 786-88 (10th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 629 F.2d 828, 830
(2d Cir. 1980); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1977). Thus, arguably,
the question whether rule 59(e) is applicable to post-judgment requests for attorney's
fees may be limited to situations in which the party requesting fees failed to do so
expressly before judgment is entered. Furthermore, it is arguable that even if a
plaintiff does not expressly request his attorney's fee before entry of judgment, the
court should still make an award. This result would comport with the liberal policy of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(c) provides that "every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(c). This rule has consistently been applied in a liberal fashion. See, e.g., Walton v.
Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 72 n.7 (3d Cir. 1977) (compensatory damages awarded
although only punitive damages were pleaded); Troutman v. Modlin, 353 F.2d 382,
384-85 (8th Cir. 1965) (jury award of $10,000 proper even though only $2,000 in ad
damnum clause); Rental Dev. Corp. of Am. v. Lavery, 304 F.2d 839, 842 (9th Cir.
1962) (failure to request cancellation of lease in landlord-tenant action deemed no bar
to such relief); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33, 40 (2d
Cir. 1958) ("[I]t is the court's responsibility to award relief required by the facts on
any proper ground, regardless of the theories urged by the parties."); Hamill v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338, 340 (10th Cir. 1954) (party may recover "upon any
theory legally sustainable under established facts regardless of the demand in the
pleadings").
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negotiations. 48  This evidences the desire to merge all substantive
issues in a dispute into one final judgment to avoid the potential for
multiple appeals from a single case." The reasoning of these courts
is questionable, however, because requests for attorney's fees are
materially different from the motions usually asserted under rule
59(e).' Requests typically governed by this rule include motions for
vacation, 51 reargument or reconsideration of a judgment, z reconsid-
48. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security. 629 F.2d 697, 705
(1st Cir. 1980). A judgment that is a consent agreement of the parties, see note 29
supra, and does not provide for attorney's fees or expressly reserve the issue may be
a final order and, therefore, subject to the time limitations of rule 59te). See Hart
Schaffner & Marx v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 101, 102 (2d Cir. 195)
(per curiam) ("consent decrees 'are to be read within their four corners . . . because
they represent the agreement of the parties, and not the independent examination of
the subject-matter by the court' "); Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 303 F.2d
283, 284 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam) ("consent decree represents an agreement by
the parties which the court cannot expand or contract"). But see Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 79 F.R.D. 122, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ('consent decree is a judicial act,
not a private contract, and may be amended by the issuing court").
49. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 788 (10th Cir. 1980); White v. New Hamp-
shire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1980).
50. Courts holding that post-judgment requests for attorney's fees in civil rights
cases are governed by rule 59(e) contend that the weight of authority supports this
proposition. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697,
700 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1980); Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 62-64 (E.D. Va.
1979). A close examination of the cases cited by these courts provides little evidence
that the issue is settled. See, e.g., Fase v. Seafarers Welfare & Pension Plan, 589
F.2d 112, 114 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978) (court denied fees request while expressly leaving
unresolved whether request governed by rule 59(e)); DuBuit v. Harwell Enterprises,
Inc., 540 F.2d 690, 693 (4th Cir. 1976) (second request for attorney's fees made after
10 days held alteration of judgment because judgment denied first request); Laufen-
berg, Inc. v. Goldblatt Bros., 187 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1951) (court stated fee
determinations should be made as part of final judgment, without explicit reference
to rule 59(e)); Hill v. TVA, 84 F.R.D. 226, 227-28 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (request made
28 months after entry of judgment held untimely without reference to whether the
decision made pursuant to rule 59(e) or rule 60). Two cases cited by the White court
involved requests under the now abandoned "private attorney general" theory of
awarding attorney's fees. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 385 F. Supp. 1226, 1243-44
(D.P.R. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 536 F.2d 453 (1st Cir.
1976); Stacy v. Williams, 50 F.R.D. 52, 55 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd. 446 F.2d 1366
(5th Cir. 1971). Requests for equitable awards of attorney's fees under this theory
have been distinguished from statutory awards because "an equitable aw~ard of fees
... [is] not part of the costs awarded after litigation, but should be sought as part of
the litigation itself." Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980).
51. Richerson v. Jones, 572 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1978); Sonnenblick-Coldman Corp.
v. Nowalk, 420 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1970); Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 68 F.R.D. 305 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Sampson v. Ampex Corp., 335 F. Supp. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd. 463
F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 538 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976); Vac-Air, Inc. v.
John Mohr & Sons, 471 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1973); Silk v. Sandoval. 435 F.2d 1266
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971).
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eration of summary judgment,- and addition of pre-judgment interest
to a judgment., These motions are essentially requests that a court
reevaluate its holdings of law and fact to determine whether the judg-
ment was correct.5
Post-judgment requests for attorney's fees in civil rights cases,
however, do "not [seek] a change in the judgment, but merely [seek]
what is due because of the judgment."' In determining that fees
should be granted or the amount a plaintiff should recover, courts
need not alter their decision on the merits of the case. Because a
court's discretion concerning the appropriateness of an award is very
narrow,' it considers the substance of its underlying decision only to
verify that the plaintiff has, in fact, prevailed." Moreover, although
the court has broad discretion to fix the amount of an award,"9 it
examines specific facts that are independent of its underlying decision
when making this determination. 1 For example, the court considers
the time and labor expended by counsel, the novelty and difficulty of
the case, the skill required in properly handling the case, any un-
usual time limitations imposed on the litigants, the experience, abil-
ity, and reputation of counsel, the undesirability of being associated
with the cause, and awards granted in similar cases.'
53. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 986 (1979);
Seshachalam v. Creighton Univ. School of Medicine, 545 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1976),
appeal dismissed, 549 F.2d 79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977); Peabody
Coal Co. v. UMW, 484 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1973); Motteler v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
447 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1971); Maryland Tuna Corp. v. The Ms. Benares, 429 F.2d
307 (2d Cir. 1970); Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 303 F.2d 716 (3d
Cir. 1962).
54. Spurgeon v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 387 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1967); Hussey
Metals v. Lectromelt Furnace, 417 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 556
F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1977); Earnest v. Donald Deskey Assocs., 312 F. Supp. 1312
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
55. Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978); see 9 J. Moore, supra
note 14, 204.12[1], at 4-67; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 44, § 2817, at
111-12.
56. Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980).
57. Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1233 (7th Cir. 1980); Dawson v. Pastrick,
600 F.2d 70, 79 (7th Cir. 1979); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir.
1979); Davis v. Murphy, 587 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 1978).
58. See notes 26-40 supra and accompanying text.
59, The amount of a fees award is within the sound discretion of district courts.
Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1980); Harkless v. Sweeny Inde-
pendent School Dist., 608 F.2d 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1979); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d
75, 78 (1st Cir. 1978); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
60. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th
Cir. 1974); Senate Report, supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 5913. See generally ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
2-106 (1978).
61. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974); accord, Walston v. School Bd., 566 F.2d 1201, 1204 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
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Determinations of awards of attorney's fees are a natural post-
judgment consideration in which remuneration is granted to a plain-
tiff, not for his damages, but for the legal expense of successfully
prosecuting a civil rights action." The requirement that a party must
prevail to be entitled to attorney's fees' indicates that a plaintiff's
success in a dispute is a condition precedent to an award. The re-
quest for an award of attorney's fees is, therefore, logically made only
upon satisfaction of this condition, which may entail the entry of a
favorable judgment.6
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)
The better view is that post-judgment requests for attorney's fees
be deemed taxable costs.6 Costs are generally assessed after the
close of the trial, and their determination is tangential to the merits
of the case." Rule 54(d) provides that the clerk of the court may tax
costs.Y Submission of a bill of costs under rule 54(d) differs from a
rule 59(e) motion because it does not affect the finality of judgmentrs
denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ist Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Veechione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp.
776, 779-800 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 466 F.
Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 2942 (1980); Phillips v. Moore, 441 F. Supp. 833, 834-35 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
See generally Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126
U. Pa. L. Rev. 281 (1977); Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 371-77.
62. Awards of attorney's fees are not made to punish a defendant, but to encour-
age enforcement of civil rights laws. Pickett v. Milam, 579 F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (8th
Cir. 1978); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); see Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles & Space
Co., 406 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
63. See notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text.
64. Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980) (attorney's fees ordi-
narily sought after litigation); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir. 1977)
(filure to offer proof of amount of fees at trial does not bar an award); Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (prevailing party
status implies finality before an award can be considered); Preston v. Mandeville, 451
F. Supp. 617, 623 (S.D. Ala. 1978) ("prevailing is a prerequisite to the invocation of
this Court's discretion to award a fee").
65. Johnson v. Snyder, No. 79-3459, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1981); Jones
v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1981); Bond v. Stan-
ton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Van Ooteghem v. Cray, 628 F.2d 488,
496-97 (5th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980);
Janicki v. Pizza, No. 78-242, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 1980); Anderson v.
Moras, No. 79-3459 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 1980).
66. 6 J. Moore, supra note 14, $ 54.77[9], at 1753 ('as a general rule the award-
ing of costs should normally await the rendition of a final judgment"); 10 C. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 44, § 2679, at 239 ("it generally is understood that the
appropriate time for taxing costs is after a decision has been reached in the action").
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
68. Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[e]ntry of the
judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs." Id. This provision, an amend-
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or toll the time within which an appeal must be made. 9 Thus, there
is no express time within which a bill of costs must be submitted. 0
It has been argued, however, that attorney's fees are "qualitatively
different" from costs because determinations of fee awards involve the
court's discretion 71 and cannot be routinely taxed by the clerk of the
court as can conventional costs. Furthermore, under other statutes,
the variety of fees and disbursements that may be taxed by the court
are explicitly delineated. 73 The primary federal statute allowing
costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, 74 for example, includes as taxable costs fees
of the clerk and marshal, and fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses.7' It does not include attorney's fees as an expense to be
taxed by the court clerk.
It has never been suggested, however, that taxable costs must be
limited to those items enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, or that Con-
gress may not enact other statutes allowing parties to recover differ-
ent items as taxable costs.76 In holding that post-judgment requests
ment to the original rule, was added to reflect the long standing federal judicial
policy that failure to tax costs does not affect the finality of judgment. Fowler v.
Hamill, 139 U.S. 549, 550 (1891); Stallo v. Wagner, 2,5 F. 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1917);
Allis-Chalmers Co. v. United States, 162 F. 679, 680 (7th Cir. 1908); Prescott &
A.C. Ry. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 84 F. 213, 214 (2d Cir. 1897) (per curiam); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, Advisory Committee Notes.
69. Only those requests enumerated in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)
toll the time for bringing appeals. Richerson v. Jones, 572 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1973);
Sonneblick-Goldman Corp. v. Nowalk, 420 F.2d 858, 859 (3d Cir. 1970). Rule 54(d)
bills of cost are not included in appellate rule 4(a). Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
70. American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 161, 163
(D. Minn. 1966); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 36 F.R.D. 31, 33-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Some courts, however, have adopted rules that impose time limitations within which
bills of costs must be served. E.g., E.D. Cal. R. 122. D.N.D. R. XXIII.
71. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
72. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 701-
03 (1st Cir. 1980); accord, Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 61 (E.D. Va. 1979).
See generally Peck, Taxation of Costs in United States District Courts, 37 F.R.D.
481 (1965); Comment, Taxation of Costs in Federal Courts-A Proposal, 25 Am.
U.L. Rev. 877 (1976).
73. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976); id. § 1922. id. § 1923.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976).
75. Id. § 1920 (1), (3). Additionally, § 1920 provides that the judge or clerk may
assess costs for "[flees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; . . . [flees for exemplification and
copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; [and] [d]ocket fees under
section 1923 of this title." Id. § 1920 (2), (4), (5).
76. One court has stated that "[i]t seems logical to conclude that by this language
Congress was choosing only to authorize recovery of one discrete type of costs-
attorney's fees-and that other costs are to be awarded under separate authority."
Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Although courts
sometimes award costs not expressly granted by a statute, their discretion "should be
sparingly exercised." Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964); see,
e.g., Guajardo v. Estelle, 432 F. Supp. 1373, 1388 (S. D. Tex. 1977) (court allowed
travel expenses, telephone calls, LEXIS time, and paralegal services as costs in ab-
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for attorney's fees are governed by rule 54(d), some courts maintain
that the phrase "as part of the costs" indicates that Congress viewed
attorney's fees recoverable under the 1976 Act as a new item of tax-
able costs.7  In fact, in Hutto v. Finney,"' the Supreme Court,
although not addressing the applicability of rule 54(d) to attorney's
fees under the 1976 Act, noted that "Congress [may] amend its def-
inition of taxable costs" and that the 1976 Act represents "Congress'
decision to authorize an award of attorney's fees as an item of
costs." ,
Admittedly, the discretionary nature of a fees determination will
require the courts to engage in a different practice than that generally
used for conventional costs. This should not, however, militate
against the use of rule 54(d). Costs may be, and sometimes are, taxed
by the judge." When the trial judge has special knowledge concern-
ing items that are taxable as costs, it is proper that he, rather than
the clerk, determine their amount."' Attorney's fees should be
deemed to fall within this category of taxable costs.
III. FURTHERING CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
UNDERLYING THE 1976 ACT
Although there is no legislative history concerning the proper pro-
cedural characterization of post-judgment requests for attorney's fees
sence of explicit statutory authorization), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 580 F.2d 748,
763 (5th Cir. 1978); Poyne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 74 F.R.D. 19, 23 (N.D. Miss.
1976) (similar allowance for law student and paralegal services as costs).
77. Johnson v. Snyder, No. 79-3459, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1981); Jones
v. Dealers Tractor & Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1981); Bond v. Stan-
ton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (5th Cir. 1980); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488,
496-97 (5th Cir. 1980); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1980);
Janicki v. Pizza, No. 78-242, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 1980); Anderson v.
M-oras, No. 79-3459 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 1980).
78. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
79. Id. at 696-97. The First Circuit, however, has reasoned that, because the
Supreme Court's statement was dicta, it is not "dispositive of the question whether
section 1988 attorney's fees fall within the specific types of taxable costs contem-
plated by [rules] 54(d) and 58." White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment
Security, 629 F.2d 697, 703 (1st Cir. 1980).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976) explicitly authorizes the clerk or judge to tax costs.
Id.; see, e.g., Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 32 F.R.D. 29, 31
(N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 319 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1963); Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-
Resisto Corp., 169 F. Supp. 453, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
81. Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 32 F.R.D. 29, 31 (N.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1963); see Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto
Corp., 169 F. Supp. 453, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (trial judge has discretion to tax
costs). The Fifth Circuit has stated that the practice of taxing costs "can be handled
best by local rule." Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 798 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980).
Federal courts enjoy great latitude in fashioning local practice rules. United States v.
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under the 1976 Act, congressional policy underlying the 1976 Act
supports the conclusion that fees requests be deemed costs. Denying
plaintiffs their just compensation on a technical procedural ground
contravenes congressional policy to encourage the bringing of suits
that further the enforcement of civil rights laws.12 Those courts that
have adopted the rule 59(e) approach, however, have reasoned that a
party's expectation that a final judgment embody a total resolution of
a dispute is best served by requiring that awards of attorney's fees be
deemed alterations of judgment.8 3 The rationale supporting this
analysis is that the interest in finality of judgment outweighs any
potential injustice that may result by limiting the time period within
which fees requests may be made.81
Although the general policies favoring judicial economy and finality
of judgment are clearly important, they should not be considered
apart from the legislative purpose underlying a specific statute."
Courts that employ rule 59(e) place plaintiffs, otherwise entitled to
fees, at a great disadvantage. Those plaintiffs who have prevailed in
their action but fail to serve their fees motions within ten days will,
without exception, be denied the fees the law presumes they should
receive.' Moreover, even if an attorney, with full knowledge of the
timeliness requirement, diligently attempts to serve his fees motion
Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 575-76 (1958); see 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) ("The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe
rules for the conduct of their business.").
82. Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 798 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); Janickl v.
Pizza, No. 78-242, slip op. at 1-2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 1980); see Bond v. Stanton,
630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980) (refusing prevailing parties recovery of attorneys'
fees for time spent appealing the case and preparing the fees application contravenes
the policy of the 1976 Act).
83. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 702-
03 (1st Cir. 1980); see Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 786-88 (10th Cir. 1980);
Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 61 (E.D. Va. 1979).
84. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697,
704 (1st Cir. 1980); Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 64 (E.D. Va. 1979).
85. See 3 C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 67.02, at
219 (4th ed. 1974) ("There is widespread preference for the method of interpreting
procedural statutes which insures that a case will not be disposed of on the basis of
procedural technicalities but will be considered on its merits and decided on the
basis of the substantive rights of the parties."); id. § 72.05, at 392-93 (4th ed. 1974)
("Remedial policies expressed in civil rights laws may be judicially extended through
the influence they have in the interpretation of other legislation."),
86. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697,
699 (1st Cir. 1980); Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F. Supp. 59, 62 (E.D. Va. 1979). There
are no exceptions to the ten day limitation on rule 59(e) motions. See, e.g., Silk v.
Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971); Spurgeon v.
Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 387 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Hulson v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 289 F.2d 726 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 835 (1961); Steward v.
Atlantic Ref. Co., 235 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1956).
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within ten days after judgment is entered, the evidentiary burden
imposed by courts may make this time requirement impracticable.
The burden of persuading a court to award the amount of attorney's
fees requested is on the requesting party.Y Attorneys must submit
affidavits that contain detailed information sufficient to allow the court
to measure the time reasonably spent preparing for and conducting
the action.rs In fact, the amount of information submitted may be so
great and its character so complex that courts often require fees re-
quests to be briefed and argued at a hearing before they will deter-
mine the amount to be awarded.
Most courts that award attorney's fees only for work done on claims
on which plaintiff has prevailed require that fees applications deline-
ate the amount of work done in relation to each specific claim
litigated." A plaintiff will not know on which issues he has pre-
vailed, however, until judgment is entered. This precludes plaintiffs
from preparing their fees applications in advance to alleviate the time
constraints of rule 59(e). The combination of the evidentiary burden
and the strict time requirement of rule 59(e) may, therefore, lead to a
reduction of the amount of fees awarded because plaintiffs may be
unable to present an adequate and reasonable accounting of their
attorney's fees.9 In Scheriff v. Beck," for example, a district court
87. Carr v. Blazer Financial Servs. Inc., 598 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (5th Cir. 1979);
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d
483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D. Colo. 1978).
88. King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 916 (1978); Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1153 (loth Cir.
1976); Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165, 167 n.2 (3d Cir. 1975);
Maloney-Crawford Tank Corp. v. Saunder Tank Co., 511 F.2d 10, 14 (10th Cir.
1975); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 681-82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd per
curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), reversed on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547
(1978). The data provided must be "fairly definite information as to the way in which
that time was spent (discovery, oral argument, negotiation, etc.) and by whom [the
work was done] (senior partners, junior partners, or associates)." City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
89. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974); White v. New
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 699 (1st Cir. 1980); see
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 10 S. Ct.
2999 (1980); McPherson v. School Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. ID. 1978);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977).
90. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Repko,
578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D.
Colo. 1978).
91. See, e.g., King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977) ([B]ills
which simply list a certain number of hours and lack such important specifies as dates
and the nature of work performed .. .should be refused.'), cert. denied, 43 U.S.
916 (1978); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 473 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (claim excluded because not supported); Heigler v. Gatter, 463 F. Supp. 80"2,
803 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (claim reduced 20% because of unsupportable records).
92. 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978).
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held that a plaintiff who had prevailed against one of two defendants
was entitled to only fifty percent of his total request because he did
not properly set forth the amount of time spent on the successful
claim."
The First Circuit, which presently applies rule 59(e), has concurred
with this view, stating that it "would not view with sympathy any
claim [brought on appeal] that a district court abused its discretion in
awarding unreasonably low attorney's fees in a suit in which plaintiffs
were only partially successful if counsel's records do not provide a
proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular
claims."" Moreover, a plaintiff may not attempt to circumvent the
ten day limitation by submitting a general motion and amending it
after ten days because this is tantamount to an extension of time
under rule 59(e), which is forbidden by the rules.9
The application of rule 59(e) to fees requests made after a consent
decree has been entered can also adversely affect civil rights plaintiffs
attempting to negotiate a settlement of their dispute. The First Cir-
cuit has held that the policy of finality supports the concurrent deter-
mination of the plaintiff's attorney's fee and his general recovery,6
and has stated that it saw nothing wrong with resolving fees issues
during the settlement negotiations." The stringent time requirement
of rule 59(e) may, in fact, cause plaintiffs to negotiate attorney's fees
at the same time they are attempting to resolve the underlying dis-
pute. The plaintiff's attorney, however, will be placed in an ethical
dilemma in this instance because settlement of fees, "although made
in the name of the plaintiff, is really one by the attorney.", The
93. Id. at 1259.
94. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978).
95. Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("if a
party could file a skeleton motion and later fill it in, the purpose of the time limita-
tion would be defeated"). See also 6A J. Moore, supra note 14, $ 59.12[3], at 59-253
to 59-254 ("if ... a party desires to support or oppose . . .a [rule 59(e)] motion by
affidavits, service should be in accordance with the general provision of Rule 6(d)").
96. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 699
(1st Cir. 1980); accord, Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 787-88 (10th Cir. 1980).
97. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 705
(1st Cir. 1980).
98. Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (E.D. Ill. 1978); accord, Mendoza
v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) ("we cannot indiscriminately
assume , . . that the amount of fees have no influence on the ultimate settlement
obtained for the class"); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir.
1977) (conflict of interest problems "are real and practical- present in all cases
where the defendant pays the plaintiff's lawyers"); Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd,
68 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (concurrent negotiation "leaves the unfortunate
impression the defendants are buying their way out of a lawsuit by direct compensa-
tion of plaintiff's lawyer"); J. Moore, Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.46, at 74
(1971) ("[w]hen counsel for the class negotiates simultaneously for the settlement
fund and for individual counsel fees there is an inherent conflict of interest"). See
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amount he recovers as his fee will usually constitute his entire re-
muneration because civil rights plaintiffs rarely can afford the costs of
having an attorney represent them." Therefore, plaintiff's attorney
may be compelled to negotiate for himself at the same time he is
attempting to settle the issue of damages. This potential for "sweet-
heart contracts" "s°-when plaintiff's attorney negotiates a tradeoff of
his client's relief for an enhanced fee-has led other courts to
forbid '0 or strongly object to 102 simultaneous negotiation of attorney's
fees and the underlying civil rights controversy.'3
Courts that characterize fees as taxable costs, on the other hand,
have sufficient flexibility to effectuate Congress' intent that fees be
awarded without risk that plaintiff's recovery will be unjustly
reduced."4 Arguably, the separate disposition of attorney's fees may
result in multiple appeals and thwart parties' expectations that upon
entry of judgment, or shortly thereafter, the resolution of their suit
will become final.'0- The use of rule 54(d), however, need not neces-
sarily have these results. Although rule 54(d) sets no express time
limit within which a bill of costs must be filed, it must be read in
conjunction with the requirement of rule 1 11 that every action be
determined as quickly as possible.1o Courts have, therefore, refused
to tax costs when the party requesting them did so after the expira-
tion of an unreasonable time."m Moreover, the danger that multiple
generally Levin, Practical, Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the Settle-
ment of Cases in Which Statutory Attorney's Fees Are Authorized, 14 Clearinghouse
Rev. 515 (1980); Note, Attorneys' Fees- Conflict Created by the Simultaneous Nego-
tiation and Settlement of Damages and Statutorily Authorized Attorneys' Fees in a
Title VII Class Action-Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977),
51 Temple L.Q. 799 (1978).
99. Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (E.D. Ill. 1978); see note 19
supra.
100. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 197T). Although
there is no presumption that lawyers will violate their fiduciary duty, the Third Cir-
cuit noted in Prandini that "[t]he court does have the duty to see to it that the
administration of justice has the appearance of propriety as well as being so in fact."
Id.
101. Id.
102. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980).
103. The Third Circuit requires that district courts approve the damage element of
the agreement before the parties may negotiate attorney's fees. Prandini v. National
Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d
1338, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1980) (court strongly discourages concurrent negotiation).
104. See pt. II(B) supra.
105. Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 787 (10th Cir. 1980); White v. New Hamp-
shire Dep't of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1980).
106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
107. Id. Rule 1 states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Id.
108. Woods Constr. Co. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 337 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir.
1964); United States v. Pinto, 44 F.R.D. 357, 358-59 (W.D. Mich. 1958); see Terket
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appeals will result from the application of rule 54(d) can be lessened
by the adoption of the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that "[a] party
dissatisfied with the court's ruling . . . apply . . . for consolidation
with the pending appeal of the merits."'
CONCLUSION
Congress and the courts have made clear the importance of award-
ing attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in civil rights actions. Judi-
cial grants of fees are made to prevailing plaintiffs almost as a matter
of course. Furthermore, the underlying goal of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is that substantial justice should triumph over tech-
nical requirements. Denominating post-judgment fee requests as al-
terations of judgment creates a technical barrier to plaintiffs' recovery
of fees. Characterizing attorneys' fees as taxable costs, on the other
hand, allows courts to fashion a complete remedy for those whose
civil rights have been violated. Applying rule 54(d), therefore, en-
sures that deserving plaintiffs will not be unjustly denied the fees to
which they are entitled.
Edward M. Roth
v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 34 (7th Cir. 1980) ("district courts ... should proceed with
attorneys' fees motions . . . as expeditiously as possible").
109. Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 34 (7th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted). Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) empowers the Courts of Appeal to consolidate sepa-
rate appeals upon their own motion. Fed. R. App. P. 3(b). If a single party has two
appeals pending from a single case, consolidation is usually appropriate. 9 J. Moore,
supra note 14, 203.15, at 3-66 to 3-67.
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